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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Backup Flight System FMEA/CIL
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. October I0. 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight
System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and
Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L
FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the
comparison is provided through additional analysis as required.
This report documents the results of that comparison for the
Orbiter BFS hardware.
The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode
"worksheets" that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI)
being identified. This product was originally compared with the
proposed NASA BFS baseline as of Oct. 1986 and subsequently
compared with the applicable (as of Nov. 19, 1987) Data
Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and
Control (EPD&C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The
comparisons determined if there were any results which had been
found by the IOA but Were not in the NASA baseline.
The original assessment determined there were numerous failure
modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were
not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA
baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe)
for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product. The
IOA prepared worksheets and agreed with the NASA analysis for the
three items. This increased the IOA worksheets from 29 to 32 and
the PCIs from 21 to 24 for t_e originaiassessment as shown in
Figure i.
The NASA and Rockwell conducted several reviews and completed a
substantial rewrite of all CILs between Dec. 1986 and Nov. 1987.
This effort included eliminating BFS as a unique subsystem by
integrating BFS CILs with primary DPS CILs. The revised NASA
baseline contained four more FMEAs for CIL items that were not
identified in the original IOA BFS product, deleted the IMU CIL
related FMEA mentioned in the previous paragraph, and moved the
ADTA and AIR Data Probe CILs also mentioned in the previous
paragraph to the GN&C subsystem. Once again, the IOA prepared
worksheets and agreed with the NASA analysis of the additional
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Figure 1 - BFS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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failures. This increased the IOA worksheets from 32 to 33 and
the PCIs from 24 to 25 for the final assessment. The IOA
assessment of the final updated baseline (Nov. 19, 1987) results
in agreement on all BFS CIL items even though there are
differences in number of items and assigned criticalities.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the assessment results.
The differences in assigned criticalities are due to different
interpretation and application of the FMEA/CIL preparation
instructions contained in NSTS 22206. The IOA analyzed BFS
hardware failures with the assumption the BFS had been or would
be engaged. The NASA analyzed BFS hardware failures as an
integral part of the DPS or EPD&C and therefore counted generic
PASS failures when assigning criticalities to BFS hardware
failure modes. The IOA interpretation neither added to or
subtracted from the CIL.
The IOA and NASA analyses differed in level of detail and method
of failure mode documentation. As a result, there are some
differences in the number of CIL items. Regardless, a Complete
mapping exists between the IOA and FMEA/CIL items. Multiple IOA
failures map into one FMEA for some hardware components and vice
versa for other BFS elements.
L
m
i
=
T Z
i
i
_ZZ
m
L
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2. I Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a t0pld_ analysis utiliz-
ing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and
are used to assess the proposed post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2
4.3
4.4
Review in-house
Document assessment issues
Forward findings to Project Manager
4
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The ground rules and assumptions used in the I0A are presented in
Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined to
limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure mode.
A subset of the failure mode keywords were identified for the BFS
team. This allowed for commonality in the analysis results.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following sections describe the BFS subsystem hardware. This
hardware comprises a GPC, DDUs, BFCs, several switches, status
indicators, and circuit protectors. An overview of the system
components is shown in Figure 2.
3.1 Design and Function
The Backup Flight System provides the flight crew with a vehicle
control capability to be used if the primary system malfunctions.
The BFS software resides in one General Purpose Computer,
normally GPC 5, during ascent and entry. In the event a generic
failure occurs in the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) or
three or more primary GPCs fail, the crew will engage the BFS.
During dynamic flight phases (all except onorbit), no capability
to return to the primary system is provided once the BFS is
engaged.
Hardware elements included in this report are those specific to
the BFS. Evaluation of components such as nav aids and flight
control sensors that are common to the BFS and the PASS and
components such as dedicated instrument displays that are driven
by the BFS outputs are excluded from this report. Processing
schemes differ between PASS and BFS with the result that some
component failures become more critical with BFS engaged. It is
beyond the scope of this report to present all the software
differences between PAss and BFS or to present a comparison of
the failure criticalities for non BFS-unique hardware with or
without BFS engaged.
The BFS is limited by definition, for this report, to those
unique hardware items that function in response to the action
taken by the flight crew to engage or disengage the BFS. A
schematic diagram of these hardware items is shown in Figure 3.
More specifically, the BFS consists of the following components:
i. Two DDUs which supply power to the BFS engage switches
on the left and right RHCs and to the Hand Controller
Engage Drivers (HCEDs) in the Backup Flight Controller
(BFC) modules. Each DDU has three power supplies (A,
B and C) redundantly tied through regulators to two of
the three Main A, B and C buses.
• Three BFCs, each with identicai mOdules A and B, which
receive inputs from crew configured switches and output
discrete signals to their respective GPCs. Logic
circuits select which GPCs control flight critical
buses and drive CRT displays prior and subsequent to
BFS engagement•
. One GPC loaded with backup flight software. From a
hardware standpoint, a GPC consists of a Central
Processing Unit (CPU) and an Input/Output Processor
(IOP), each with many subcomponents. Since there is
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Figure 2 - BFS SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - BFS ENGAGE/DISENGAGE HARDWARE AND DATA INTERFACES
8
i
I
Im
m
n
u
B
only one GPC to provide the backup control capability
it will be treated as a black box. Regardless of what
hardware component fails rendering the GPC inoperable,
the criticality is the same as a generic black box
failure.
• Twenty crew activated switches (15 GPC, 2 BFS engage, 1
BFS disengage, and 2 CRT) that are used to control GPC
operating configuration and CRT interfaces with the BFS
GPC.
. Crew interface with the BFS is through the
Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS). During normal
flight operations, one of the cathode ray tubes (CRTs)
in the forward station will be commanded by the BFS.
BFS MCDS selection in the forward station is governed
by the BFS CRT switch on panel C3 or the GPC/CRT key on
the keyboard. Current preengage BFS procedures call
for CRT 3 to be the BFS CRT in the forward station.
The BFS operates in one of two operating states: engaged or
disengaged. The BFS is intended to remain in a disengaged state
during routine operations allowing_the PASS to control the
vehicle. Both the engage and disengage states are provided to
the GPCs through a set of three hardware modules called Backup
Flight Controllers (BFCs). These BFCs provide interface through
a series of discrete signals between the GPCs and associated crew
station switches. Engage is accomplished by verifying that the
BFS GPC output switch is _n the backup position and that the DDU
power supply breakers are in, and depressing the engage momentary
pushbutton on either the right or the left RHC.
When one of the RHC buttons is depressed, three discretes (A, B,
C) of ones are sent to the BFS GPC through the BFC modules. The
BFS GPC must receive two of three discretes plus a zero discrete
from the I/O terminate B before the BFS can be engaged. After
the BFS is engaged, control of the vehicle is assumed by the BFS,
and the PASS GPCs go to a state of software halt. The BFS then
controls the flight critical and payload data buses and specified
display keyboard buses. Indications that the BFS is engaged are
that BFC eyebrow panel lights on F2 and F4 will be ON, the BFS
output talkback (TB) on panel 06 will be gray, and all PASS GPC
output TBs on panel 06 will be barberpole.
In the disengaged state, the BFS GPC processes vehicle control
parameters in parallel with the PASS GPCs. The BFS maintains
knoWledge of the vehicle state by listening on the flight
critical data buses commanded by the PASS GPCs. The disengaged
BFS GPC also performs limited SM and FDA functions during OPS
i, 3, and 6. To disengage the BFS from the engage s_ate, _the BFC
disengage switch on pane1 F6 is positioned to DISENGAGE (up
position). The engage discretes to the BFS will be reset to zero
and the I/O terminate discrete set to one. Control of the FC and
PL data buses will be released to the PASS. This is indicated
by the BFC light going OFF, the PASS output TBs going gray, and
9
BFS output TB going barberpole. The PASS GPCs must be re-Initial
Program Loaded (re-IPLed) prior to disengage. Thus the BFS
disengage capability is provided only during quiescent vehicle
flight.
m
If BFS is engaged it will drive several dedicated instrument
displays in the forward station. This is instrumentation needed
to safely fly the vehicle during the final phases of entry and
landing. Two of the three Attitude Direction Indicators (ADIs)
are driven by the BFS in OPS 1 and OPS 3. The four scales
(Alpha, Accel, M/Vel, EAS) of the Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI) are
driven by BFS in OPS major modes 304 and 305. Likewise, the four
scales (Alt Accel, Alt Rate, Alt, Rad Alt) of the
Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI) are driven by the
engaged BFS in major modes 304 and 305. The Horizontal Situation
Indicator (HSI) provides magnetic heading, course, course
deviation, glide slope deviation, and primary and secondary
bearing, and the Surface Position Indicator (SPI), provides
elevons, body flap percent, rudder, aileron, and speedbrake
percent. The HSI and SPI are driven by the engaged BFS.
i
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The BFS GPC and three BFCs are located in Avionics Bays 1 and 2.
All other hardware components are located in the forward flight
deck. The BFS interfaces with Orbiter subsystems via the flight
critical and payload data buses and flight forward and flight
aft MDMs.
I
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3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the BFS hardware
components.
3.4 BFS Sensitivity to Interfaoing Subsystem Operation
m
i
An exhaustive comparison of the BFS and PASS is beyond the scope
of this report. However, a limited investigation of BFS
sensitivity to operation in certain guidance, navigation and
control subsystems was performed. References 12 and 13
constituted the BFS capability description for this
investigation.
g
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Compared to the PASS, the BFS capability for fault detection is
limited due to minimum redundancy management capability. As a
result, the BFS is substantially more vulnerable to malfunctions
in interfacing subsystems. The specific subsystems investigated
included the Inertial Measurement units (IMUs), Air Data System
(ADS), Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and Accelerometer Assemblies
(AA), Rotational Hand Controller (RHC), Speedbrake Thrust
Controller (SBTC), Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA), and
a limited collection of cockpit switches.
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3.4.1 Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
The BFS does not use the Built in Test Equipment (BITE) or
the ECHO features provided by the IMUhardware. The BFS
only faults an IMU when it has detected a Communications Fault
(COM FAULT). In nominal operations, the BFS uses a mid value
select. If one IMU is COM FAULTED, the lowest numbered IMU which
has not been COM FAULTED will be selected. If two IMUs have been
COM FAULTED, then data from the remaining IMUwill be processed.
If all three IMUs are COM FAULTED, the system will then try to
reselect the last failed IMU.
This data selection process makes the BFS extremely sensitive and
vulnerable to IMU number 1 malfunctions which do not result in a
COM FAULT on IMU number 1. Without regard to IMU number 1
performance, a simple COM FAULT on either IMU number 2 or 3 will
allow that performance to be immediately propagated throughout
the entire GN&C system.
3.4.2 Air Data System (ADS)
The data from this subsystem is vital to many computations, since
several of the items measured by this subsystem are used
throughout the GN&C software. The main item of concern is the
Nose Landing Gear Uplock Discrete, V51X0300X. This discrete is
used by the BFS software to determine if a correction factor is
applied in the angle of attack calculation, the corrected static
pressure calculation, and the corrected total pressure
calculation. These three terms are then used to determine Mach
number, pressure altitude, dynamic pressure (Q-Bar), equivalent
airspeed (EAS), and estimated true airspeed. The inclusion of
the correction factor in the calculation is due to changes in the
flow around the ADS when the nose gear is down.
Depending on the size of the correction factor being applied, the
corrected static pressure and corrected total pressure values
could be changed by a significant amount. Any calculations which
use these values in either a first order or second order
calculation would be in error, and this error would be factored
into the Guidance and Navigation functions. The errors could be
large enough to cause a loss of the vehicle.
3.4.3 Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and Accelerometer Assemblies (AA)
The BFS uses three of the four RGAs on the Orbiter and three
of four RGAs on the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). Similarly, the
BFS uses only three of the four AAs. One set of scale factor and
bias data is used for the three Orbiter RGAs, another set of
scale factor and bias data is used for the RGAs on the SRBs, and
another set of scale factor and bias data is used for all AAs.
The PASS provides scale factor and bias data for each of the RGAs
and AAs.
The use of a single set of scale factor and bias data for a group
of RGAs and AAs is acceptable if the LRUs are very consistent.
ii
If however, the performance of the LRUs is inconsistent, the data
coming back could have large, over-compensated variations.
3.4.4 Rotational Hand Controller (REC)
The BFS does not support RHC processing in ascent modes. The BFS
does not validate the RHC inputs by using the data good indicator
as in the PASS. There is no requirement to process the left RHC
data before or after the right RHC data. The lack of a
requirement for the order of processing RHC data is different
than that found in the PASS. There may be a need to process
the Commander's inputs before the Pilot's, as is done in the
PASS.
3.4.5 spee@rale Thrust Controller (SBTC)
The BFS does not have manual throttling capability in ascent as
does the primary. The BFS does process both SBTCs.
3.4.6 Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA)
The BFS processes only the Commander's inputs.
redundancy when the BFS is engaged.
There is no
3.4.7 Cockpit Switches
The following switches are redundant, one set at the Commander's
station and another set at the Pilot's station. The BFS
processes only those switches at the Commander's station.
Therefore, when the BFS is engaged, the PLT switches can not be
considered redundant to the CDR switches.
TACAN source for HSI F6 $4
MSBLS source for HSI F6 $4
Nav source for HSI F6 $4
V72K8587X
V72K8589X
V72K8588X
ADI Attitude Ref PB a F6 $3
PB b
ADI Attitude Inertial F6 $3
ADI Attitude LV/LH F6 $3
ADI Attitude reference F6 $3
V72K2051X
V72K2052X
V72K2015X
V72K2016X
V72K2017X
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4.0 ASSESBHENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the BFS hardware initially generated 29
failure mode worksheets and identified 21 Potential Critical
Items before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, additional worksheets were generated. The
analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L
baseline. Upon completion of the assessment, there was agreement
on all CIL items. The FMEAs for non-CIL items have not yet been
revised; therefore, an IOA assessment of non-CIL FMEAs is not
included in this report.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed versus the
IOA baseline is presented in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component
DDU
BFC
GPC
Switches
Circuit Protectors
NASA
4
2
4
5
7
IOA
1
9
2
5
8
Issues
0
0
0
0
0
Total 22 25 0
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The differences in the number of CIL items for a specific
component are attributable to differences in the depth of
analyses and documentation approach.
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains the additional IOA analysis worksheets that were
prepared to support the NASA FMEA/CIL assessment. Appendix F
provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheets.
Table II presents a summary of the IOA failure criticalities.
Further discussion of each of these subdivisions and the
applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
i
13
TABLE II Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
3/3 TOTALCriticality:
DDU
BFC
GPC
SWITCHES
CIRC. PROTECT.
INDICATORS
TOTAL
1/1
6
2
4
5
17
2/IR
1
1
w
1
3
2/2 3/IR
1
4
3/2R
1
1
2
m
1
3
2
6
1
i0
2
9
9
2
33
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Of the failure modes analyzed, twenty-five were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA critical items is presented
in Table III.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Critical Items
Criticality: I/i TOTAL
mm
I
DDU
BFC
GPC
SWITCHES
CIRC. PROTECT.
INDICATORS
6
2
4
5
2/IR
1
1
1
2/2 3/IR
1
3
3/2R
w
1
1
9
2
5
8
TOTAL 17 3 - 4 1 25
z
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
DDU
BFC
GPC
SWITCHES
CIRC. PROTECT.
INDICATORS
IMU
ADS
BFS-101
BFS-201 to BFS-210
BFS-301 to BFS-302
BFS-401 to BFS-409
BFS-501 to BFS-509
BFS-601 to BFS-602
BFS-1001
BFS-2001 to BFS-2002
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4.1 Display Driver Unit
w
The NASA update documented loss of output and partial output for
the left and right DDUs as four separate failures. The IOA
documented the same failures on one analysis worksheet. The
analyses agree that DDU output failure should be a CIL item.
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4.2 Backup Flight Controller
The NASA update considered BFCs as black box components of the
Data Processing and Software system. Two BFC CIL failure modes
were identified: loss/erroneous output (2/IR) and inadvertent
engage (3/1R, fails B screen). The IOA recognized the single
point failure potential (criticality i/I) of several functional
components within the BFCs and elected to document failures at
lower than black box level of detail. The disparity in
criticality assignment is attributed to a philosophical
difference between the IOA and FMEA. The IOA criticality is
based on the effec_s_o_a failure_occhrrlng to a BFS component
after a generic PASS failure, i.e., when the BFS is required.
The NASA analysis considers a generic PASS failure as the first
failure when assigning criticality to BFS components. As a
result, for many component failure modes, the IOA criticality
will appear to be more severe than the FMEA criticality.
The specific IOA BFC failures are mapped into the higher level
NASA FMEAs in the final assessment. The IOA agrees with the FMEA
criticalities if the PASS failure is considered.
in summary, the IOA makes two recommendations:
i. FMEAs should be generated for functional components
within the BFC.
2. Instructions contained in NSTS 22206 should clearly
specify whether PASS failures should be considered when
assigning criticalities to BFS hardware failure modes.
4.3 General Purpose Computer
z
U
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The IOA generated two failure mode worksheets for the BFS GPC
which correspond to four FMEAs. The IOA treated the GPC as a
black box, identified no output and erroneous output as failure
modes, and assigned a criticality of I/i to each. The NASA
update identified the same two failures but treated the GPC as
two black boxes i.e., a CPU and an IOP and gave each failure a
2/IR criticality. The analyses agree that GPC output failures
should be CIL items. The criticality discrepancy is due to the
same philosophical difference discussed in the previous section.
The IOA therefore recommends no change to the updated NASA GPC
FMEAs.
4.4 Switches
L
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Except for minor criticality differences, the IOA and FMEA agree
on five switch failure CIL items. The IOA analysis originally
identified a failed open BFC disengage switch (3/2R, fails B
15
screen) as a sixth CIL candidate. As a result of further review
during the assessment task, the IOA believes the crew can readily
detect the failure and perform a simple work-around procedure if
necessary to disengage the BFS on orbit. Therefore, the IOA
concludes the fail open mode for the BFC disengage switch
contacts should not be considered as a critical item and
recommends the failure be documented in the updated FMEAS for
non-CIL items.
4.5 Circuit Protectors
The IOA identified open circuit of fuses F9, FI0, FII, and F49 as
criticality i/I failures and documented them as four separate CIL
items. The same four fuses and failure modes are documented as
criticality 2/IR in two updated FMEAs. The IOA concludes that
since both approaches identify the same components and failure
modes as CIL items there are no significant issues.
The NASA update includes two EPD&C-D&C Subsystem FMEAs that
identify open circuit failure of circuit breakers CB29, 30, and
32 as 3/IR criticality and includes them as CIL items because
they fail the B screen. The IOA initially concluded that all
redundancy screens were passed. Upon further review, the IOA
agrees with the NASA update
The IOA prepared three supplemental worksheets for failures
overlooked in the original analysis. These covered open and
short circuit failures in the BFS GPC and BFC main bus isolation
diodes and open circuit failure of fuse F28 in the main bus
supply line to the BFS BFC power monitor logic. The IOA agrees
with the FMEA for these CIL items.
In summary, there are no issues regarding BFS related circuit
protectors between the IOA and updated NASA FMEAs.
4.6 Indicators
There is an exact match between the IOA and the baseline FMEAs
for the BFC engage lights. There are no issues.
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Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
1. NSTS 22206 Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
Critical Items List (CIL), i0 October
1986
2. JSC 18820 Data Processing System Briefs, Basic,
Rev. A, PCN-I, 4-20-85
3. VS70-971099 Rockwell Integrated Systems Schematics,
OV-99, 103, 104 GNC & DPS, 3-14-85
4. JSC 12770 Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Volume
5, Data Processing System, 3-21-84
5. JSC 18219 Flight Procedures Handbook, Post
Insertion, Final Revision A, 1-18-85
6. JSC 18817 Flight Procedures Handbook, Deorbit
Prep, 3-1-83
7. TDI23 Backup Flight System Software Workbook,
BFS 2102, 8-10-82
8. V72 FILE III Orbiter Operations and Maintenance
Requirements and Specification Document,
6-13-86
. NSTS 08171 FILE I Operations and Maintenance Requirements
and Specifications Document, 7-14-86
i0. JSC 12820 STS Operational Flight Rules, PCN-I,
2-14-86
11. TDI98/AI98 GNC Overview Workbook, GNC OV 2102,
8-30-83
12. MGO38101 Backup System Service Program
Requirement Document, Seq. l, Rev. H,
3 January 1985
13. MGO38106 Backup Flight System, Hardware Interface
Program and GN&C Interface Program
Requirements Document, Rev. E, 3 July
1985
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ACRONYMS
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ADTA
AOA
ATO
BFC
BFS
BSS
CIL
CPU
CRIT
CRT
C&W
DDU
DEU
DPS
DU
EVA
FA
FF
FM
FMEA
GPC
GSE
HCED
IMU
IOA
IOP
IPL
KU
LRU
MCDS
MDAC
MDM
MM
MMU
NA
NASA
NSTS
OMRSD
OMS
PAS
PASS
PB
PCI
RCS
RHC
RI
RM
RPC
w
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Air Data Transducer Assembly
Abort Once Around
Abort to Orbit
Backup Flight Controller
Backup Flight System
Backup System Services
Critical Items List
Central Processing Unit
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Caution and Warning System
Display Driver Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Data Processing System
Display Unit
Extra Vehicular Activity
Flight Aft
Flight Forward
Failure Mode
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hand Controller Engage Driver
Inertial Measurement Unit
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Input/Output Processor
Initial Program Load
Keyboard Unit
Line Replaceable Unit
Multifunction CRT Display System
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Major Mode
Mass Memory Unit
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Primary Avionics System
Primary Avionics Software System
Pushbutton
Potential Critical Item
Reaction Control System
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Remote Power Controller
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RS
RTLS
SFP
SM
STS
SW
TAC
TAL
TD
THC
w
ACRONYMS
Redundant Set
Return to Landing Site
Single Failure Point
Systems Management
Space Transportation System
Software
switch
Tacan
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Touch Down
Translational Hand Controller
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Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
b
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 222Q6, Instructions For PreDaration
o_ FMEA/CIL, _00Gtober 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition ta OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
_;GHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MU_T_PD_ ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
O_F-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
_RIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
_HASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
0NORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, _nstruct$ons for
PreDaration of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
m
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•
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.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the designspecifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permit£ed to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of _OA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE". Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
T
B-5
mm_
ls.PPENDTX B
DEFINITIONS e GROUND RULE8 • AND la.SSUMPTTON8 L.
B.3 BFS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
I. BFS failures are analyzed assuming that the BFS is (or
will be) engaged.
RATIONALE: Failure analysis and criticality
determination is done assuming that the
BFS must work when called upon to do so.
o Failures which resulted in BFS engagement are not
identified or analyzed.
RATIONALE: Except for the PASS, it is assumed that
other subsystems are operating within
normal limits.
. Only BFS-specific components and failure modes are
analyzed.
RATIONALE: Failure analysis of PASS/BFS common
components is accomplished within the
PASS analysis.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ABSESSHENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(pre and post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets idendtifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
I_-2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data:
Baseline = Pre 51-L FMEA/CIL
New = Post 51-L _A/CIL (Baseline plus Proposed
Changes)
CIL Item:
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row:
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
i
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
BFS-101
05-3-12200A-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
I01
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
[ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
im
b
L
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.
mm
mm
mm
i
mm
m :
I
mi
REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-2
W_
i :
ms
im
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
BFS-101A
05-3-12200A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
i01
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNbANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
u
i
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-3
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-101B
NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12200B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
i01
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
[P] [p] [F]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [N]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
BFS-101C
05-3-12200B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
I01
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ F ]
[ P ]
[N]
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
w
u
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-201
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
201
HALT RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ I /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
i
m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF
THAT HALT RELAY IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT FMEA.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HALT
RELAY AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILED CLOSED CONSEQUENCES BE
ADDED TO THE FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-202
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
202
HALT RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF
THE HALT RELAY IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT FMEA.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HALT
RELAY AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILED OPEN CONSEQUENCES BE ADDED
TO THE FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-203
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
203
HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
U
i
i
I
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA IDENTIFIED _COMP_NENT FAILURES WITHIN_A_,_Fc. THE _A
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF
THE HALT CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF
OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-204
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
204
HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF
THE HALT CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF
OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.
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ASSESS_NT WO_SHEET
ASSESS_NT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENTID: BFS-205
NASA _EA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAC_P FLIGHT SYSTEM
205
ENGAGE / DISENGAGE _GIC
LEAD _ALYST: L.W.HINSDA_/E.E.PRUST _ _
ASSESS_:
CRITICALITY RED_D_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
Q
I
I
m
B
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i
_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONAL_.: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
__S:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILLES WITHIN A BFC. THE _A
T_ATED THE BFC AS A BUCK BOX. THE IOA AGREES T_T FAILU_ OF
THE ENGAGE/DISENGAGE _GIC IS CO_D BY THE BFC _SS OF
OUTPUT/E_ONEOUS OUTPUT _A.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-206
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAC P FLIGHTSYS 
206
CRT SELECT LOGIC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE NASA
ANALYSIS TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. IF NASA GENERATES A
NON-CIL BFC FMEA, THE IOA SUGGESTS A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF
THE CRT SELECT LOGIC AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE LOSS
OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FAILURE CONSEQUENCES BE INCLUDED FOR
COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENTID: BFS-207
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
BACKUPFLIGHT SYSTEM
207
BFC POWER SUPPLY (5 VDC)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF
THE 5 VDC BFC POWER SUPPLY IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF
OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
BFS-208
05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2O8
POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[ F ]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
A
C F ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC.
[x]
[ ]
THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT INADVERTENT
OPERATION OF THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE
BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.
r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-209
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
209
POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
m
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ]
z
[]
M
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL i
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
l
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA
TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT LOSS OF
OUTPUT FROM THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE BFC
LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-210X
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-I-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
210
BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER - BFC 2
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-301
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B01-1-i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
301
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [P]
[p] [F] [F]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
I
mm
m
D
m
B
ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA PREPARED SEPARATE FMEAs FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA
TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX.
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE
WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED
ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP)
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-301A
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B02-1-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
301
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
[ P] [ P] [ P] [ x] *
[P] [F] [F] [X]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
g
w
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA PREPARED SEPARATE FMEAs FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA
TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX.
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE
WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED
ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS C6NCLUbE _TKAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP)
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-302
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B01-1-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
302
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[p] CF] IF]
[N] [N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
i
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA PREPARED SEPARATE FMEAs FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA
THE n,_A COtn_'TEDPASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE
WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED
ON THE ASSUM_ION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU _D_OR_IOP) _
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
BFS-302A
05-5-B02-I-2
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
302
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[F]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA PREP_D SEPARATE _As FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA
TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX.
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE
WHEN ASSIGNINGCRITICA_ITY_ THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED
ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE T_T GPC (CPU _D OR iOP)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B32-1-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
401 -
BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mm
l
mm
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO BFS ENGAGE SWITCH
FAILURES WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. ....THE IOA ASSIGNED _- .....
CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN CONTACT FAILURE OF
THE ENGAGE SWITCH IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-402
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
402
BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[.3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE FAIL CLOSED MODE FOR THE ENGAGE PUSHBIFfTON CONTACTS WOULD
CAUSE_NKD_TENT BFS ENGAG__ __THI:S ALONE IS NOT _
JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL. HOWEVER, THE IOA
CONSIDERS THIS TO BE A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE FAILURE AND RECOMMENDS
IT BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEAs FOR NON-CIL ITEMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
BFS-403
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
403
BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AS A RESULT OF FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE B
SCREEN FAILURE SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PASS. THE !OARECO_NDS THE
FAIL OPEN MODE FOR THE BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH BE COVERED IN THE
UPDATED FMEAFOR NON-CIL ITEMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-404
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
05-5-B31-I-I
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
404
BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA COUNTEbPASS FAILURES IN ADDITIONTO BFC DISENGAGE
SWITCH CONTACTS BEING FAILED CLOSED WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS
WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT THE SWITCH FAILURE MODE
IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-405
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SySTEM
405
BFC CRT DISPLAY SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAIL OPEN MODE FOR THE BFC CRT DISPLAY SWITCH IS INSUFFICIENT
FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL. THE IOA RECOMMENDS IT BE COVERED IN
THE UPDATED FMEAs FOR NON-CIL ITEMS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-406
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
406
BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO SWITCH, AND ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MODES FOR THE
BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEAs FOR NON-
CIL ITEMS. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-407
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW7-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
407
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ p] [ P] [ P] [ x] *
[p] [P] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
U
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
C / ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE FMEA COUNTED A GENERIC PASS FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC
SWITCH FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED
CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC POWER SWITCH FAIL
OPEN CONTACTS IS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE
CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-408
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
05-5-B15-I-I
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
4O8
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) OUTPUT SWITCH
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[p] [P] IF]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
r[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC
OUTPUT SWITCH FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WOULD BE
ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT ERRONEOUS OPERATION OF
THE GPC OUTPUT_SWITCH IS JUSTIFICATION _0_ INCLUSION ON THE CIL,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-409
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B17-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
409
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC MODE
SWITCH FAILURE_EN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE I6A_AS_I_GN__ED r
CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT ERRONEOUS OPERATION OF
THE GPC MODE SWITCH IS _STIFICATION FOR INCLUSION......_ ON THE CIL,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2103A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TO L(R) DDU
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
501
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5 AMP. - MAIN A (B,C) SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_E IOA BFSANALYSIS AGREES Wi_THE BASELINE FMEA (EPD&C-
D&C SUBSYSTEM).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-501A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2103B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TO L(R) DDU
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
501
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5 AMP. - MAIN A (B,C) SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] ....
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... _DE_TE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA BFS ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE BASELINE FMEA (EPD&C-
D&C SUBSYSTEM).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
MDAC ID: 502
ITEM: FUSE F9, I AMP. - CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY TO
DISENGAGE SWITCH AND BFC MODULES IA & IB (HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] IF] [P] IX] *
[P] IF] IF] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:.
ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, FI0, AND FII. THE IOA PREPARED
SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE
EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE FII
(CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ABILITY TO ENGA_E_BFS-.--iF_EITHERFgOR_FI0-(_I_CUiT PROTEtTi0_ _
FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS
BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCs THAT INTERFACE WITH MODULES A
AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCs 1 AND 4) AND MODULE A
IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN
THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCs COULD DEVELOP.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE
FUSES IS JuSTIFICATION°?ORiNCLUSION ON THE cIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
MDAC ID: 503
ITEM: FUSE FI0, 1 AMP. - CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY TO
DISENGAGE SWITCH AND BFC MODULE 2A - HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P] [ F] [ P] [X] *
[P] [F] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, FI0, A/_D FI1. TH_ _0A PREPARED
SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE
EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE FII
(CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) _$ULTS I_ LOSS OF _-
ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS. IF EITHER F9 OR Fi0 (_IR6_UIT PROTECTION
FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS
BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCs THAT .....INTERFACE_.......WITH MODULESo__ __ _A
AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCs 1 AND 4) AND M_O_D_U_ A
IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN
THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCs COULD DEVELOP.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE
FUSES IS JUSTIFICATION F0R INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS4-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
504
FUSE FII, 1 AMP. - CNTL BUS CA1 SUPPLY TO
DISENGAGE SWITCH AND BFC MODULES 2B, 3A, 3B - HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, FI0, AND FII. THE IOA PREPARED
SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE
EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE FII
(CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS. IF EITHER F9 OR FI0 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS
BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCs THAT INTERFACE WITH MODULES A
AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCs 1 AND 4) AND MODULE A
IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN
THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCs COULD DEVELOP.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE
FUSES IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
w
m
REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/30/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
MDAC ID: 505
ITEM: FUSE F49, 3 AMP. - ESS BUS 3AB SUPPLY TO GPC
OUTPUT SWITCHES (BACKUP & NORMAL DISCRETES)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
[ 2 /IR ]
[ l/l ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[p] [P] IF] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] CN] CN] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO THE FUSE
FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY
BASED ON THE ASS_ION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT FUSE F49 FAILED OPEN
MODE IS JUSTIFICATION F0R INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-506
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
MDAC ID: 506
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP. - ESS BUS SUPPLY TO BFS GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5) POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /1R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REDUNDANT
FUSES AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAIL OPEN CONSEQUENCES BE
INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS IN THE UPDATED FMEAs FOR NON-CIL ITEMS.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FMEA BE CREATED FOR THIS FAILURE
MODE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-507X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDI02-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
507
DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-508X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDI02-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
508
DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CI_RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-509X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
MDAC ID: 509 ...........
ITEM: FUSE F28, 5 AMP - MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO BFS BFC
POWER MONITOR LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[p] [ p] [ P] [ x] *
[p] [P] [p] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicab_fe)_ v
........... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO THE FUSE _
FAILED OPEN MODE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED
CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS HAS BEEN OR WILL BE
ENGAGED.
SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE
FUSE IS JUSTFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-601
NASA FMEA #: 05-8-BFS010-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
601
BFC ENGAGE LIGHT
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE NASA ANALYSIS AND THE IOA AGREE COMPLETELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-602
NASA FMEA #: 05-8-BFS010-0002
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
602
BFC ENGAGE LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] [ ]*
[P] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE NASA ANALYSIS AND THE IOA AGREE COMPLETELY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-IOOIX
NASA FMEA #: 05-8-BFS003-O001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
LEAD ANALYST:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
i001
INERTIALMEAS NT C
L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES wITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
THIS FAILURE.
HOWEVER, THE FAILURE MODE ANALYZED IS A SOFTWARE FAILURE,
AND IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A HARDWARE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-2001X
NASA FMEA #: 05-8-BFS012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM .....
2001
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA)
LEAD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
D
I
m
,,m
i
mm
mm
mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CI_ RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE.
THE DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY IS DUE TO A DIFFERENCE IN
INTERPRETATION OF FMEA/CIL PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS.
HOWEVER, THE IOAB_EL_IE_VE_SoT_T THIS HARDWARE IS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM, AND SHOULD INSTEAD BE DEALT
WITH IN THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM FMEAs.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
BFS-2002X
05-8-BFS013-I
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2002
PROBE (AIR DATA)
L.W. HINSDALE, E.E. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE.
THE DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY IS DUE TO A DIFFERENCE IN
INTERPRETATION OF FMEA/CIL PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS.
HOWEVER, THE IOA BELIEVES THAT THIS HARDWARE IS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM, AND SHOULD INSTEAD BE DEALT
WITH IN THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM FMEAs.
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APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
NASA FMEA
05-3-12200A-1
05-3-12200A-2
05-3-12200B-I
05-3-12200B-2
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-i-2
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-I-2
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM
i01
i01
i01
I01
201
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-I-2
05-5-B30-I-3
05-5-B01-I-I
05-5-B02-I-I
05-5-B01-I-2
05-5-B02-I-2
05-5-B32-I-I
05-5-B3 i-I-i
05-6S-BSW7-1
05-5-B15-I-I
202
203
204
205
207
208
209
210
301
301
302
302
401
404
407
408
2/IR
2/IR
211R
2/IR
I/i
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C)
TO L(R) RHC
POWER SUPPLY A (B, C)
TO L(R) RHC
POWER SUPPLY A (B, C)
TO L(R) RHC
POWER SUPPLY A (B, C)
TO L(R) RHC
HALT RELAY
3/2R
2/IR
i/i
i/I
I/i
HALT RELAY
HAND CONTROLLER
ENGAGE DRIVER
HAND CONTROLLER
ENGAGE DRIVER
ENGAGE / DISENGAGE
LOGIC
BFC POWER SUPPLY
(5 VDC)
i/i
i/i
3/IR
I/i
1/1
1/1
I/I
2/IR
1/1
POWER UP/DOWN
MONITOR LOGIC
POWER UP/DOWN
MONITOR LOGIC
BACKUP FLIGHT CNTL
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BFS ENGAGE
PUSHBUTTON
BFC DISENGAGE SW
i/i
I/i
BFS GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
POWER SWITCH
BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) PWR SW
J
FAILURE MODE
m
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
PARTIAl OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
PARTIAL OUPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
PARTIAL OUTPUT
INADVERTENT
I
OPERATION, FAILS
TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE
LOSS OF DISCRETE
OUTPUT
LOSS OF 28 VDC
OUTPUT i
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
PARTIAL O_PUT, n
FAILS OUT OF
TOLERANCE
INADVERTENT i
OPERATION
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT ENGAGE m
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
m
I
FAILS TO CLOSE
I
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN, FAILS TO
RE-OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE,
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
FAILS OUT OF
"BACKUP"
R
D-2
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
b
m
05-5-B17-i-1
05-6Q-2103A-1
05-6Q-2103B-I
05-6S-BFUS4-1
05-6S-BFUS4-1
05-6S-BFUS4-1
05-6S-BFUS3-1
05-6S-BDI02-I
05-6S-BDI02-3
05-6S-BFUS5-1
O5-8-BFS003-000
05-8-BFS012-I
05-8-BFS013-I
409
501
501
502
503
504
505
507
508
509
I00!
2001
2002
x/1
3/IR
3/IR
I/I
I/I
i/I
i/I
3/IR
3/IR
1/z
1/i
1/1
1/1
BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) MODE SW
CIRCUIT BREAKER,
7.5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER,
7.5 AMP
FUSE F9, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS AB3
FUSE FI0, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS AB3
FUSE FII, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS AB3
FUSE F49, 3 AMP. -
ESS BUS 3AB
DIODE, MAIN BUS
ISOLATION TO BFS
GPC AND BFC
DIODE, MAIN BUS
ISOLATION TO BFS
GPC AND BFC
FUSE F28, 5 AMP -
MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO
BFS BFC POWER
INERTIAL
MEASUREMENT UNIT
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER
PROBE (AIR DATA)
INADVERTENTLY
IN "HALT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
FAILS TO CONDUCT,
OPEN, HIGH
RESISTANCE
SHORTS, CONDUCTS
IN REVERSE
DIRECTION
OPEN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
D-3
Ui
_°
m
i
m
U
i
mm
U
mmm
n
m
mm
mm
U
Ei
APPENDIX E
ANALY6IB WORKBHEET8
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
18, Analysis of the Backup Flight System, (15 December 1986).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly, and function performed. For each
failure mode, possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in the Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL,
NST$ 22206, _0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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bINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/8v
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER - BFC 2
INADVERTENT ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023-0003
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATU_ BFs ENGAGE, POSSIB_ FORCE FIGHT IF SO_ PASS GPC
OUTPUTS ARE NOT DISABLED, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL - LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND LOSS OF CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o3/87
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC
FAILS TO CONDUCT. OPEN, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: JANTX INI1884
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER PATHS TO EACH IOP, CPU AND
BFC ARE ISOLATED BY DIODES. TWO DIODES CAN FAIL WITH NO EFFECT.
THE THIRD FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF THE INTERFACING GPC.
THREE FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH
BFS ENGAGED, THREE FAILURES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF
VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z2/o3/8v
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
5O8
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC
SHORTS, CONDUCTS IN REVERSE DIRECTION
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: JANTX INI1884
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER PATHS TO EACH IOP, CPU AND :_
BFC ARE ISOLATED BY DIODES. TWO DIODES CAN FAIL WITH NO EFFECT.
THE THIRD FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF THE INTERFACING GPC.
THREE FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH
BFS ENGAGED, THREE FAILURES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF
VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: i/i
509 ABORT: I/I
ITEM:
MONITOR LOGIC
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE F28, 5 AMP - MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO BFS BFC POWER
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P LAU CH: I/i + RTLS: I/I
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAF ING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0500
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE PREVENTS BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH BFS ENGAGED,
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
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REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: I001 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT (IMU)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM PASS DUE TO GENERIC FAILURE
OF PRIMARY SYSTEM SOFTWARE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST
J.J.EWELL
SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) IMU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/?UNC
•PRELAUNCH : 3/2R RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF : I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC409-0004-0010
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS SOFTWARE TORQUING INPUT OR MODING COMMAND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NAVIGATION ERRORS WILL ACCUMULATE CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE
CONTROL. SUCCESSFUL BFS TAKEOVER IS PRECLUDED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lS/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
_AD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDA_/E.E. PRUST
J.J.EWE_
SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AIR DATA SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF :
ONORBIT :
DEORBIT :
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : i/1
3/3 TAL: i/I
3/3 AOA: I/i
i/1 ATO : 3/ 3
1/1
A [ 2 ] B [F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC409-0011-0006
CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECT_D_I"_"AT-*_'..,/_..-_,.v,, ,._. '_ _ : _: _ _ _ ....
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM AN ADTA CAN AFFECT CALCULATIONS OF CRITICAL
FIGHT CONTROL PARAMETERS. IF UNDETECTED, LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS
OF VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW IS PROBABLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/I
ITEM: PROBE (AIR DATA)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDALE, E.E. PRUST
J.J.EWELL
SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) AIR DATA SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/i ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
1/1
313 '
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC432-0206
c[P]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: _........
FAILURE IN EITHER PROBE (IF UNDETECTED BY ADTA BITE PRIOR TO
ENGAGING BFS) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
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This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s). The worksheets include
those from the previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper
1.0-WP-VA86001-18, Analysis of the Backup Flight System, (15
December 1986) and the supplementary worksheets contained in
Appendix E of this report. The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA
Number, IOA Assessment Number, NASA criticality and redundancy
screen data, and IOA recommendations.
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Appendix F Resolution/Issue/Rationale Codes
Code Definition
1 IOA and NASA criticalities differ. IOA does not
consider PASS as a redundant capability to the BFS.
NASA counts PASS failure as the first failure when
assigning BFS failure mode criticalities.
2 IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the subject
failure mode.
3 IOA identified failures within an LRU.
4 FMEA went one level deeper than the IOA.
5 IOA and FMEA document same failure mode differently.
6 NASA deleted failure mode impact on BFS from Nov. '87
baseline.
7 NASA moved CIL to GN&C subsystem in Nov. '87 baseline.
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APPENDIX F
NASAFMEA TO IDA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS II NASA I) IOA RECOMMENDATIONSI :
tl __ Ii .......................................... i
...... ...m...l ............................ 1} ................ I! "----'-- --
NASA _ IOA IICRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS
FMEA NUMBER _ ASSESSMENTNUMBERI_HW/F _ A B C II HWIF I A B C
=' = = II I] ' =
B5-3-122BBA-I
BS-3-122BOA-2
B5-3-122BOB-I
B5-3-122B_B-2
B5-5-BBI-I-I
_5-5-BBI-I-2
_5-5-B_2-I-I
B5-5-B_2-1-2
B5-5-B15-1-1
B5-5-B17-I-I
@5-5-B38-I-2
O_-_-B_B-I-3
B5-5-B31-1-1
_5-5-B32-I-I
BS-6Q-21B3A-I
B5%Q-21B3B-I
B5-6S-BDIB2-1
85-65-BDI_2-3
B5%S-BFUS3-1
BS-6S-BFUS4-1
B5-6S-BFUSS-I
B5-6S-BSW7-1
B5-B-BFSBB3-BBOI
BS-B-BFSB!B-BBBI
B5-B-BFSOIB-BBB2
05-8-BF5@12-I
BS-B-BFSBI3-!
BFS-2_6
BFS-4B2
BFS-4B3
BFS-4@5
BFS-4B6
BFS-5@6
BFS-IBI
BFS-IBIA
BFS-I@IB
BFS-IBIC
BFS-3_I
BFS-3_2
BFS-3BIA
BFS-3g2A
BFS-4_8
BFS-4B9
BFS-2_I
BFS-2B2
BFS-2B3
BFS-2_4
BFS-2_5
BFS-2B7
BFS-2_B
BFS-2B9
BFS-21BX
BFS-4B4
BFS-4_I
BFS-501
BFS-SBIA
BFS-gB7X
BFS-5_BX
BFS-SB5
BFS-5B2
BFS-SB3
BFS-SB4
BFS-5BgX
BFS-4_7
BFS-iBBIX
BFS-6@I
BFS-6B2
BFS-2_BIX
BFS-2BB2X
]] 1
]I /
]_ 311R
]I 3/!R
_I 3/IR
,," _/iR
]I 211R
II Iii
:_ 211R
" IIi
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
211R
211R
211R
211R
2/IR
2/1R
311R
211R
3tlR
311R
3/IR
311R
3/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
211R
2/IR
211R
i/l
3/3
3i3
2/IR
2/IR
II 3/3
:I 3/2R
If 3/3
II 3/3
II 311R
P P F I /
P P F I I
P P F : /
P P F _ /
P P P I /
I ]
P P P I I
I /
P F P _ /
P F P _ /
F F P I /
F F P _ /
F F P I 1
F F P I /
F F P I /
F F P I 1
F F P I /
F F P I /
P F P I /
P F P I /
P F P I /
P F P I /
P F P I !
P F P I /
P F P I /
P F P i /
P F P I I
P F P I /
P F P I /
P P P ', /
P P P ] /
NA NA NA I /
p p p ', 1
P P P I I
NA NA NA I /
NA NA NA I /
P P NA
P P NA
P P NA
P P NA
P P P
OTHER I ISSUE
(SEELEGENDCODE) I
= I
3
2
2
2
2
2
i, 5
i, 5
i, 5
I, 5
I_ 4
4
1,4
4
I
I
I, 2, 3
I, 2, 3
1,3
1,3
1,3
1
1,3
1,3
1,3
i
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